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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case
by virtue of Utah Code Annotated, 78-2a-3 which states that the
Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction over appeals from
District Court in criminal cases except for first or capital
degree felonies.

(v\

NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a criminal case. Defendant
Baird was charged with unlawfully possessing in excess of
16 ounces of marijuana contrary to Section 58-37-82 (a) (i)
U.C.A. as amended, a third degree felony.
A motion to suppress and trial were held in the Fourth
Judicial District Court for Juab County, State of Utah
before the Honorable Boyd L. Park. Defendant Baird1s motion to
suppress was denied and defendant Baird was tried without
a jury and found guilty by Judge Boyd L. Park.

(vi)

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

May a police officer lawfully stop and seize the driver
of an automobile when the sole reason is that he has
unartricuable feeling that a validation sticker on the
license plate is "not right"?
May a police officer lawfully continue the seizure of
an individual after the initial belief for stopping that
individual and automobile was in error?
May a police officer lawfully continue investigating a
driver and his automobile after the police officer's
initial belief for stopping the driver and automobile
has disappeared?
Must evidence which was obtained in violation of an
individual's rights under the Fourth Amendment to the
United States Constitution and Article I, Section 14
of the Constitution of the State of Utah be suppressed?
Does a search for an automobile, although designated
an inventory search become an invalid investigatory
search when the actual intent of the police in conducting the search is to find contraband they believe to be
in the automobile?
Does the warrantless inventory search of the locked
trunk of an automobile constitute a search in violation
of defendant's Fourth Amendment Rights and for his
rights under the Utah Constitution?

(vii)

DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
Constitution of the United States
Amendment IV
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers and effectf against unreasonable searches
and seizures, shall not be violated/ and no warrants shall
issuef but upon probably causef supported by Oath or
affirmationf and particularly describing the place to be
searched^ and the persons or things to be seized.

Constitution of the United States
Amendment XIV
Section 1.
All persons born or naturalized in the United States,
and subject to the jurisdiction thereof/ are citizens of
the United States and of the State wherein they reside*

No

State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States;
nor shall any State deprive any person of lifef liberty or
property/ without due process of law; nor deny to any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws.
Constitution of Utah
Article If Section 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden-

Issuance of warrant.]
The right of the people to be secure in their persons,
housesf papers and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures shall not be violated; and no warrant shall
issue but upon probable cause supported by oath or
affirmation, particularly describing the place to be
searchedf and the person or thing to be seized.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case.
This is a criminal case.

Defendant Baird was charged

with unlawfully possessing in excess of 16 ounces of
marijuana contrary to Section 58-37-82 (a) (i) UCA as
amended, a third degree felony.
B.

Course of proceedings below
Prior to trial, a Suppression Motion hearing was held

on the 8th day of May, 1987 before the Honorable Boyd L.
Park.

Defendant Baird moved to suppress all evidence obtained

from the defendant's automobile.

The motion was denied.

Judge Boyd L. Park prepared an Order and Findings with respect
to his denial of Baird1s Motion to Suppress.

The case was

tried without a jury before the Honorable Boyd L. Park on
May 20, 1987.
Defendant Baird through his counsel, Jimi Mitsunaga,
renewed his Motion to Suppress at the beginning of the
trial.

Judge Boyd L. Park again denied Defendants Motion

Suppress and the evidence of the marijuana was admitted.
The court found the Defendant Baird was guilty as
charged.
Time for sentencing was waived and the matter was
referred to Adult Probation and Parole Department.

(ix)

C. Disposition at Trial
The honorable Boyd L. Park found that the Defendant,
Richard B. Baird was guilty as charged,
P.

Statement of Facts
On February 9, 1987f Officer Paul Mangelson, an

officer with the Utah Highway Patrol was parked in the
media of 1-15 under the "junk pile overpass" near the Mona
overpass in Juab County. (Suppression Hearing Transcript
pages 5 & 6).
Officer Mangelson was parked facing southbound
traffic, parallel to the freeway and was clocking vehicles
with a radar unit and observing vehicle inspection stickers
and registrations. (Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 6)
At approximately 3:45 p.m. Officer Mangelson observed
an automobile moving in a northerly direction in the inside
lane of traffic. (Suppression Hearing Transcript pgs. 6 &
18.)
Officer Mangelson noted that the automobile had
Arizona plates on it.

Officer Mangelson noted that the

automobile had a front plate on it and as it passed him he
noted that it had a rear plate on it. (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 6)
Officer Mangelson stated that as the car went past him
he paid further attention to it because "I noticed the

(x)

registration, the decal on the rear plate that it didn't
appear to be valid so I pulled out and pursued the vehicle
to see if it was a valid plate.11

(Suppression Hearing

Transcript page 7.)
Officer Mangelson followed the car for approximately
one mile and then stopped the vehicle with the use of a red
spotlight.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 7.)

When the car pulled off the road and stopped. Officer
Mangelson drove his car directly behind the car in the
emergency parking area.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript

page 8.)
Officer Mangelson stated that he knew of no traffic
violation committed by defendant Baird prior to stopping
him and that he had observed no equipment violation with
respect to defendant's automobile. (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 17.)
Officer Mangelson also stated that he had no received
any transmission from any Highway Patrolman regarding
either Defendant Baird or his car. (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 17.)
Officer Mangelson when asked whether or not he could
see the validation sticker on Defendant Baird's vehicle
stated, "I could not tell what it was, it didn't appear
to be valid."

(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 19.)

When asked why he said "it did not appear to be valid"

(xi)

by defendant Bairdfs attorneyf Officer Mangelson states
"It was down in the lower corner where it should be but
something just struck me funny about it.

It didn't look

right." (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 19.)
When asked again by the defendant's attorney why it
didn't look right Officer Mangelson stated simply "Like I
say it didn't just look right to me".(Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 19.)
Officer Mangelson in response to questioning by
defendant's counsel agreed that the only reason he followed
defendant was because he couldn't tell if the sticker on
the license plate was a 1986 or 1987 sticker. (Suppression
Hearing Transcript page 8f 24, and 25.)
This also was the general testimony of Officer
Mangelson at trial.

(Trial page 7)

After Officer Mangelson stopped his car behind
defendant Baird's carr Officer Mangelson exited his car and
walked toward defendant's car. When he came within
approximately fifteen feet of defendant Baird's car he
noted that the license plate sticker was a valid 1987
sticker.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 8, 24 and 25.)

Officer Mangelson admitted that after he noticed the
valid sticker he no longer had a reason for stopping
defendant Baird.

(Suppressin Hearing Transcript page 25.)

Apparently Officer Mangelson had noticed new shocks on
defendant Baird's automobile at approximately the same time
that he noticed the sticker on the license plate was valid.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 26.)
(xii)

Officer Mangelson, at that point when he noted the
valid license plate sticker and the new shocks, did not
suspect Defendant Baird of any kind of wrongdoing.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 26.)
After noticing that the sticker was valid Officer
Mangelson continued to walk towards Defendant Bairdfs car.
As Officer Mangelson got closer to Defendant's car he
noticed that the tires were new, that on the rear floor of
defendant's car was a jack and tire iron, and that a gas
cap, which had been twisted off, lay on the rear seat.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 8, 9 and 26.)
At about the time Officer Mangelson was about to talk
to defendant Baird he also observed the keys in the
ignition but didn't observe any gas cap key with the
ignition keys. (Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 9 & 27.)
Officer Mangelson admitted that all of these observations
occurred after he had stopped defendant Baird's automobile.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 27.)
Officer Mangelson then asked Defendant Baird, who had
remained in his car, to produce his driver's license.
Defendant Baird produced a Utah Driver's License.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 9.)
Defendant Baird also produced a paper registration for
the car showing that a person in Arizona was the owner of
the vehicle. (Suppression Hearing Transcript page 9 and
Trial Transcript page 11.)
(xiii)

Officer Mangelson indicated that during this time he was
talking to defendant Baird and he could detect the odor of Marijuana coming from the vehicle.

(Suppression Hearing, page 27)

Officer Mangelson asked Defendant Baird if he was carrying
any drugs, alcohol or contraband in the vehicle or guns, and
defendant Baird answered no* (Suppression Hearing, page 10)
Officer Mangelson asked defendant Baird if he could
search defendant's car and defendant B^ird indicated the he
did have an objection. (Suppression Hearing, page 10)
Officer Mangelson then returned to his own car, and
checked to see if defendant Baird 1 s vehicle was stolen and
who the registered owner of the vehicle w a s . (Suppression
Hearing Transcript pages 29, 30, 32, and 3 2 .

Trial

Transcript pages 12 and 13.)
Officer Mangelson also asked for a driver f s license
check on Defendant Baird.

Officer Mangelson was advised

that defendant Baird f s license was suspended for financial
responsibility reasons. (Suppression Hearing, page 11)
Officer Mangelson went back to defendant Baird f s car
and advised him of the suspension.

Officer Mangelson

said it appeared that defendant Baird didn't believe him so
Officer Mangelson invited the defendant to go to the patrol
car to verify for himself that his license was suspended.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 11.)

(xtv )

Defendant Baird exited his car. Officer Mangelson
frisked him for weapons, and both of them sat in the patrol
car at which time the police dispatcher verified that
defendant Bairdfs driver's license has been suspended.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript page 11.)
Officer Mangelson then advised defendant Baird that the
defendant could not drive his vehicle and that defendant
was under arrest for driving with a suspended license.
Officer Mangelson then gave defendant Baird his Miranda
rights. (Trial transcript page 13.) (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 11.)
Officer Mangelson then arranged for a wrecker to pick
up the defendant's car and transport it to Painter Motor
Company in Nephif Utah. (Supression Hearing, page 11)
After Defendant's car was picked up by the wrecker
defendant Baird was transported by Officer Mangelson to the
Public Safety Building in Nephi. (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 12.)
At the Public Safety Building defendant Baird was
advised as to the amount of bail he would have to pay.
Defendant Baird was unable to make bail. (Suppression
Hearing Transcript page 12.)
The keys to defendant Baird's vehicle were obtained by
Officer Mangelson from the jail. (Suppression Hearing
Trancript page 35.)
(XV).

Officer Mangelson was asked if Defendant Baird's car
keys were taken without the knowledge and consent of the
defendant. Officer Mangelson stated "I think that I told
him I was going to have to do an inventory on his car."
(Suppression Hearing Transcriptf page 35,)
Howeverf Officer Mangelson admitted that he did not
make any statement in his written report to the effect that
he had indicated to defendant Baird that the police were
going to conduct an inventory search of defendant's car.
(Suppression Hearing Transcript pages 36 and 37.)
Officer Mangelson admits that if he did talk to
Defendant Baird about an inventory search it was simply to
inform the Defendant Baird of the search and not to obtain
his permission. (Suppression Hearing page 37)
Officer Mangelson asked the County Sheriff/ another
State Trooperf Dennis Avaryf and the County Attorney/
Mr. Eyref to go with him to conduct an inventory of
Defendant Bairdfs car. (Suppression Hearing page 12-13)
Officer Mangelson testified that the reason he asked
the Sheriff/ Trooper Avaryf and Mr. Eyre to accompany
him on the vehicle search was because Officer Mangelson
suspected that defendant's vehicle contained marijuana.
(Trial page 26.)
(xvi>

The above individuals accompanied Officer Mangelson to
Painter Motor where defendant Bairdfs vehicle had been
taken and conducted a search of Defendant Bairdfs vehicle.
(Trial page 15 and Suppression Hearing Transcript page 13
and 14.)
A written list was made of items found in defendant's
vehicle/ and photographs were taken by Officer Mangelson of
the car and items in the car at this time. (Suppression
Hearing Transcript page 13 and Trial page 15.)
In the trunk of Defendant Baird's carr Officer
Mangelson

found 14 bags of green leafy material that he

said appeared to be marijuana. (Suppression Hearing
Transcript page 14 and Trial page 17.)
Officer Mangelson indicated that he opened one of the
bags and found a green leafy material appearing to be
Marijuana.

(Trial page 17.)

Officer Mangelson stated that the bags taken from the
truck were tied by knots on the top of the bag and that the
green leafy material was wrapped in a cellophane material
inside of the bags. (Trial page 26.)
Defendant's counsel/ Mr. Mitsunagaf stated that he
would stipulate that if David Murdock were called to
testify he would testify that the 14 bags were each found
to contain crushed marijuana and the toal weight of the
same were approximately 165 pounds. (Trial page 2.)

(xvii)

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
A.

The stop of Officer Mangelson of Defendant Baird

was a seizure of Defendant and his automobile.
The cases interpreting the Fourth Amendment of
the Constitution of the United States and Article I,
Section 14 of the Utah Constitution require that a
police officer have articulable grounds to sustain a
reasonable suspicion that the person seized has committed,
is committing or will commit a violation of the law.
Office Mangelson presented no articulable grounds as
to why to believe a law had been or was being violated but
to the contrary spoke in terms of something not feeling
right.
Such a reason as expressed by Officer Mangelson is not
sufficient reason to justify his search of defendant and
defendant's vehicle.
B.

Even granting arguendo that the initial stop and

seizure Office Mangelson was justified, after he
ascertained that the license plate decal was valid, he no
longer had any reason to continue the seizure of Defendant
Baird.

Since the seizure by Officer Mangelson became

invalid after Officer Mangelson ascertained that the
license plate sticker was valid, all observations,
questions to defendant Baird and the investigation of
defendant Bairdfs driver's license and car registration

(xviii)

were tainted by the invalid seizure, and offered no grounds
for the arrest of defendant Baird nor for the inventory
search of the car.
C.

The so called inventory of defendant Bairdfs car

was invalid because it stemmed from an invalid arrrest.

In

addition, the inventory was in fact an investigatory search
whose intent was not that of making an inventory but rather
of discovering if contraband were in defendant Bairdfs car.
D.

This search of defendant Baird's car consisted of

opening the locked trunk of defendant Bairdfs car without
his consent.

The law has held that there is no need when

making an inventory of entering a locked area such as a car
trunk.

Thus the warrantless search of the trunk of

defendants car was made in violation of his Fourth
Amendment rights and his rights under the Utah Constitution
and any evidence obtained by such search should have been
suppressed at defendant Baird's trial.

(xix)

ARGUMENT
Point I
Evidence presented at trial was obtained by an unconstitutional seizure and search.
A.

Officer Mangelsonfs actions of stopping defendant

Baird and his car constituted a seizure within the meaning
of the 4th and 14th Amendments of the United States
Constitution and Article I, Section 14 of the Constitution
of Utah. Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391,
59 L.Ed. 2d 660 (1979); United States, v. Brignoni-ponce,
422 U.S. 873, 95 S.Ct. 2574, 45 L.Ed.2d 607 (1975); United
States v. Mallides, 473 F.2d 859 (9 Cir. 1973); United
States v. Nicholas, 448 F.2d 622 (8 Cir. 1971); and State v.
Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985)
B.

Officer Mangelson did not have a constitutionally

permissable reason to seize defendant.

In Delaware v. Prouse,

The United States Supreme Court held:
"Accordingly we hold that in except in those situations
which there is at least articulable and reasonable
suspicion that a motorist is unlicensed or that an
automobile is not registered, or that year the vehicle
or the occupant is otherwise subject to seizure for
violation of law, stopping an automobile and detaining
the driver in order to check his driver's license and
the registration of the automobile are unreasonable
under the 4th amendment." 440 U. S. at 663.
C. Officer Mangelson did not have an articulable and
reasonable suspicion that defendant was involved in
criminal activity, past, present or future.

-1-

A review of the transcript of the supression hearing
shows that Officer Mangelson did not have a specific reason
to believe that either the vehicle or the driver was in any
way violating any law.
Since this particular element of testimony of the
officer is crucial to defendant's claim that the seizure
was unconstitutional, the transcript is set forth.
(Suppression Hearing, Page 6-7.)
Q.

Now can you describe the vehicle that you

observed?
A.

The vehicle observed was a late model Cadillac.

It was a vehicle that had Arizona plates on it.

As it

came by I noticed that it had a front plate and as it
passed me I noticed that it had a rear plate.
clocked him on the radar at a speed of 56.

Now I

It was a

maroon colored carf shinyf nice looking automobile.
Q.

As the vehicle went past, did you pay any further

attention to it?
A.

Yes.

I did.

Q.

For what reason.

A.

I noticed the registration the decal on the rear

plate, that it didn't appear to be valid to me so I
pulled out after seeing this vehicle to see if it was
a valid plate.
Q.

And how long did you follow that vehicle?

-2-

A.

I would say a mile.

Q.

Upon following the vehicle, could you make any

further observation with respect to the registration
plate?
A.

No.

I could tell that the month on it was 12 but

I could not tell if it was 1986 or a 1987 validation
sticker.
At the suppression hearing defendant's counsel
cross-examined Officer Mangelson.
Q.

Officer, there was no traffic violation was there?

A.

You mean prior to stopping him?

Q.

That is correct.

A.

That is correct.

Q.

There was no equipment violation.

A.

None that I know of.

Q.

Or did you observe?

A.

No.

Q.

You haven't received any transmission from any

patrolman in that whole day regarding this defendant's
vehicle.
A.

No, I hadn't.

(Suppression Hearing Transcript p. 17)

A little further on in the cross-examination by defense
counsel, defendant counsel asked:
-3-

Q.

Yes, you thenf at that time that the car was

approaching you observed the Arizona license plate,
and nothing wrong with that was there?
A.

No.

Q.

You observed the rear Arizona license plate and

nothing was wrong with that?
A.

No.

Q.

You observed what you called a validation sticker

or is that what you call it?
A.

Correct.

Q.

As the car passed youf you said you could not see

or could you see the validation sticker?
A.

I could not tell what it was - it did not appear

to be valid.
Q.

Why do you say, "it did not appear to be valid"?

A.

It was down in the lower corner where it should be

be but something just struck me funny about it.

It

didn't look right.
Q.

Why didn't it look right, number one, you didn't

even get close enough to discern what it was?
A.

Like I say, it didn't just look right to me.

Q.

Let me establish that, when the car passed you you

saw a sticker attached to the Arizona license plate
and it was in the location that it should have been,
is that correct?
A.

That is correct.
-4-

Q.

Okayf now at that pointf something struck you

funny, is that what your testimony was.
A.

Well, I think my testimony was that I could tell

the December but I couldnft tell whether it was 1986
or 1987. (Suppression Hearing Transcript Pg. 18 & 19.)
Again at the trial we find the following testimony
with regard to this crucial matter.
Under direct examination by Mr. Eyre, the county
attorney, Officer Mangelson indicated the reason why he stopped
the defendant's vehicle and the defendant in the first place.
Q.

Describe what you observed on that occasion with

respect to the vehicle driven by Mr. Baird?
A.

The vehicle approached northbound, it was a white

over maroon.

It was a nice looking automobile.

the vehicle at 56.

I clocked

I observed the vehicle had a front

plate which was an Arizona plate.

I observed that it had one

visible occupant.
As the vehicle went by me, I observed it had a rear
registration plate of Arizona and there was a question on
the validity of the plate, the validation decal as it went
by me.
Q.

After you made those initial observations, what

then did you do?
A.

I pulled out and proceeded North on 1-15 to try

and get a closer look at the plate to satisfy my own mind
that it was a valid plate.

I was still unable to make that

satisfaction in my mind and decided to stop this vehicle.
-5-

Trial transcript, page 7.
Thus, we can see again from the transcript of the
trial, that Officer Mangelson showed that he had no reasonable
articulable suspicion that a crime was being committed.
It should be noted that once Officer Mangleson had
seized defendant by pulling defendantfs car over, he
observed various things with respect to defendant's
automobile which he claimed made him suspicious.
However, these observations occurred after the seizure.
None of the observations by Officer Mangelson, which he said
made him suspicious were mentioned as reasons he stopped
defendant Baird's car in the first place.
Officer Mangelsonfs testimony specifically indicates
that he observed the various things after he had exited his
car and was walking toward defendant's car.
Thus, the sum of Officer Mangelson's testimony with
respect to why he pulled over defendant's car was that he
couldn't tell if the date decal on the license plate was
valid.

The crux of Officer Mangelson's testimony was that

he could not explain exactly why the validation did not
look correct but could only say "like I say, it
just didn't look right to me."

(Suppression Hearing

Transcript, page 19.)
The United States Supreme Court has stated that for a
police officer to justify a seizure he has to articulate
the facts and what his experience reveals as to those
facts.

The Supreme Court has indicated that such

generalities as "he didn't look right" will not suffice.
-6-

Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S., 47, 99 S.Ct. 2637, 61 L.Ed, 2d,
357 (1979).
In Brown, the Supreme Court found the officer's
assertion that the defendant "looks suspicious" is
insufficient.

443 U.S. at 52.

Also in Brown, Chief Justice Burger wrote for a unanimous
court and stated, "The Fourth Amendment requires that a
seizure must be based on specific, objective facts
indicating that society's legitimate interests required the
seizure of the particular individual, or that the seizure
must be carried out pursuant to a plan emboding explicit,
neutral limitations on the conduct of individual officers.
443 U.S. at 51.
Utah Code Annotated, 77-7-15, reads: Authority of
Peace Officer to stop and question suspect - Grounds:
"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions."
In the instant case, Officer Mangelson had less reason
to make a seizure than the officer did in Brown, a seizure
of which the United States Supreme Court disapproved.
Moreover, the officerfs belief would not meet "reasonable
suspicious standards.
From the testimony of Officer Mangleson, he was not
even suspicious that a crime was being committed.

All

he could articulate was that something didnft look right.
-7-

Iff in factf Officer Mangleson did believe something was
was suspicious it was not a reasonable suspicion and he
could not and did not articulate the reason why he had
such suspicion.
In recent language/ the United States Supreme Court
held that the police "must have a particularized and objective
basis for suspecting a particular person stopped of
criminal activity."

U.S. vs. Cortezy 449/ U.S. 441f

101 S.Ct. 690/ 66 L.ed. 2d 621 (1981).
To aid this court in deciding if reasonable cause
existed for the stop by Officer Mangelson we can examine a
case where the United States Supreme Court listed what
would constitute sufficient evidence to seize and stop a
suspected vehicle. United States v. Sharpef 470 U.S. 675/
105 S.Ct.

1568

f

84 L.Ed 2d 605 (1985).

The Court in Sharpe concluded that a reasonable
suspicion existed as to the suspected transportation of
drugs by a vehicle. While the Officer Mangelson states that
his suspicions were directed towards the license plate,
Sharpe is informative as to what constitutes facts
sufficient for reasonable suspicion.

Sharpe stated that

the reason for suspicion exists for all the following facts
are present.
1. Two vehicles that have traveled in tandem for
twenty miles;
2.

The area was near the coast and known to be fre-

quented by drug traffickers;
3.

One of the vehicles was a pickup truck with a

camper shellr often used to transport large quantities of
marijuana;

4*

The windows of the camper were covered over with

bedsheet material rather than curtains;
5.

The truck appeared to be handfully loaded;

6.

Both vehicles took evasive actions and started

speeding when a state patrolman began following them.
Assuming such a grouping of facts the Court stated
that "taken together as appraised by an experienced law
enforcement officer, that provided clear justification to
stop vehicles and pursue a limited investigation/" it
should be noted that the facts required by the Cortez case
to constitute reasonable suspicion to stop the vehicle and
pursue a limited investigation were facts, that had to
be known by the officers before they actually stopped the
vehicle* 470 at 682, Footnote No 3; i.e., prior knowledge.
Sharpe is very illustrative when compared to the facts
of the instant case.

In the instant case Officer Mangelson

was unable to articulate any facts whatsoever that provided
grounds to a reasonable suspicion.
In the instant casef Officer Mangelson could not articulate
to the court what was causing him concern with the license
decal, much less being able to articulate to the facts
upon which his decision to stop defendant was based. The
transcript shows that Officer Mangelson didnft believe
anything was wrong or suspicious, but didn't feel right
regarding the license plate.
-9-

Policy dictates that if all that is required by a police
officer is that he has a feeling to see that something is
wrong with a decal on the license plate to be able to stop
a car, then the constitutional standard in seizing a car
becomes a tenuous and purely subjective as compared to the
constitutionally protected individual right.
If this Court agrees with the Trial Court that the evidence seized should be admissible this Court would be holding
that a police officer may stop a car at his discretion.

This

discretionary kind of stop is precisely what the various United
States Supreme Courts decisions have been trying to avoid, and
what they say cannot be allowed to happen.
In Delaware v. Prusey 440 F. 648 (1979) the United States
Supreme Court held that random stops must be based upon
reasonable suspicion in order to avoid arbitrary exercise
and discretion on the part of the police.

The Court in

Delaware stated that road block would probably be proper
provided that among other factors, that roadblocks "do not
involve the unconstrained exercise of discretion."

Other cases

have held with respect to roadblock type searches of certain
vehicles the lack of discretion of the police officers in
the field was one of the major reasons for the validity of
such roadblocks.
(D.Minn. 1984);

Stark v. Terpish, 590 F. Supp. 1057,
State

v. Peskins, 673

-10-

P.2d 1174 (Kan.1983).

In addition in case of State of Utah v. Carpena, 714,
P2d, 674 (Utah 1986) we find a factual situation similar to
the instant case. In that case a police car patroling a neighborhood in which a large number of burglaries had recently
occurred, observed at 3 a.m.f a slowly moving automobile
with Arizona plates. As in our situation, the police
officer in Carpena
offense.

did not observe any criminal or traffic

The police car followed the automobile for three

blocks and then turned on his red lights. The officer took
some keys from the occupants of the automobile, opened the
trunk and found 30 pounds of marijuana.

In a per curium

opinion, the Utah Supreme Court agreed with the District
Court that the police office had no reasonable suspicion to
make an investigatory stop.

The court stated that "the

officer had no objective facts on which to base a
reasonable suspicion that the men were involved in criminal
activity".

714 P.2d at 675.

When compared with Carpena, the instant case has
less facts to enable Office Mangelson to make a stop.
Allowing the evidence found and seized by Officer
Mangelson because of his unconstitutional seizure and
search, would be tantamount to giving the police the
discretion that has been strictly prohibited by both the
United States Supreme Court and the Utah Supreme Court.
All evidence obtained by searches and seizures in
violation of the United States Constitution is inadmissible
-11-

in a State Court. Mapp vs. Ohiof 367 U.S. 643, 81 S.Ct.
1684f 6 L.Ed 2d 1081 (1961), State of Utah vs. Carpena,
714 P.2d 674 (Utah 1986).
Point II
Evidence obtained by Officer Mangelson was obtained
after his purported reason for the stop had disappeared.
Even granting arguendo that Officer Mangelsonfs stop
and seizure of defendant

Baird, and his car were not viola-

titive of defendant's rights, the observations and search that
follows such were unconstitutional.

Officer Mangelson

stated that after he had pulled the defendant over and had
stopped directly behind the defendant's vehicle, he exited
his patrol car and came within fifteen feet of defendant's
vehicle when he realized that the driver's license plate
had a valid date decal on it.

It was only after Officer

Mangleson made the observation as to the license plate that
he continued to walk towards the car and make other
observations concerning the vehicle.
Transcript pages 24, 25, and 26.)

(Suppression Hearing

Officer Mangelson was

asked by defense counsel, Mr. Mitsunaga, whether or not
Officer Mangelson suspected defendant Baird of any
kind of wrongdoing after he had noticed that the license
carried a valid date sticker.
probably not".

Officer Mangelson answered,

(Page 26, Suppression Hearing Transcript.)

-12-

Thus after observing, that his "hunch" was incorrect
i.e., that the date sticker was current, Officer Mangelson
still did not have any reasonable suspicion that defendant Baird
had committed or was commiting a crime.

The stopping by

Officer Mangelson of defendant Baird's car when he flashed his
red spot light constituted a seizure as reflected above.
This seizure continued, in that defendant Baird only knew that
he had been pulled off the road by the police officer.
Defendant Baird did not know the reason and of course, had a
reasonable belief that he could not leave. After Officer Mangelson found out that the license plate was in fact valid, he had
no right to continue the seizure or hold of defendant Baird as
he

approached defendant Bairdfs car.

The purpose for Officer

Mangelson approaching defendant's car and defendant Baird could
only have been to make a further investigatory observation and
require defendant Baird to produce his driver's license and
registration.
In a similar case, the Supreme Court of Ohio
held that once a reason for a stop of a car has passed
the police no longer had a right to continue such seizure.
State vs. Chatton, 463 N.E., 2d 1237 (Ohio 1984) •
In Chatton, the police officer stopped a car for
failing to have license plates. The police officer then
observed a temporary tag as required by law on one of the
windows of the car.

The police officer then continued to
-13-

the driver's side of the automobile and requested the
driver to produce his driver's license.

The police officer

determined that the driver's license had been suspended.
The police officer then placed the driver under arrest.
The police officer searched the vehicle and found a gun.
The driver was convicted of carrying a concealed weapon.
The lower appellate court reversed the trial court and the
Ohio Supreme Court upheld the reversal of the trial court.
The Ohio Supreme Court held that once the police officer
had observed the temporary tag, the driver could not be
detained further to determine the validity of his driver's
license absent some specific and articulable facts
indicating that the detention was reasonable.
In the instant case the trial court indicated that
Officer Mangelson noted shortly after he exited his own car
the decal on the license of defendant Baird's car was
proper and that he had no further reason to continue the
seizure of the defendant and his car.

Even the incredibly

weak reason Officer Mangelson gave as to the reason why he
had stopped Defendant Baird in the first place was now
gone.

The various factors that Officer Mangleson stated

that he had noticed with respect to the defendant's car,
including new tires, new shocks, twisted off gas cap, the
jack on backseat, and no gas key on the key ring, were
things he noticed after he noticed the decal was valid.
-14-

Granting arguendo that Officer Mangelson had a reason
to make an initial seizure of Defendant Baird and his car,
such reason vanished as soon as Officer Mangelson noticed
the decal on the license plate was valid.

The observations

made by Officer Mangelson after he noted the valid sticker was
made pursuant to his seizure which had become invalid.
Thus the observations made by Officer Mangelson and the
checking on the validity of defendant's driver's licenser
and car registration were also invalid, as was the
resulting arrest and so called inventory search.
Point III
The search of Defendant Baird1s car was not an inventory
search or was an improperly conducted inventory search.
Granting arguendo that the initial seizure of
defendant by stopping his car was valid, and granting
agruendo that the subsequent observationsf the checking of
defendant's driver's license and car registration and the
arrest of Defendant Baird were validf the search of the
defendant's locked trunk/ without his permission was a
search made in violation of defendant's Fourth Amendment
rights and his rights under Article I, Section 14f of the
Utah Constitution and any evidence obtained from such invalid
search have been excluded from defendant's trial.
The search of defendant Baird's car was made without a
warrant and therefore was per se unreasonable under both
the Fourth Amendment of the United States Constitution and
under the Constitution of Utah. Katz vs. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967);
-15-

State vs. Romero,660 P.2d 715 (Utah 1983); State vs. Harris,
671 P.2d 175, (Utah 1983); State vs. Griffin, 626 P.2d 478
(Utah 1981).
It is clear that the search of the car, especially the
locked trunk was not a mere inventory search, but rather
was a search conducted to find evidence of crime and not to
merely inventory the car.
In South Dakota vs. Opperman, 428 U.S. 364, 96
S.Ct. 3092, 49 L.ed.2d, 1000 (1976) the facts indicate
that defendant's illegally parked car was towed to the city
impound lot where officers first observed a watch on the
dashboard and other items of personal property located on
the backseat and that back floorboard, inventoried the
contents of the car, including items found in the unlocked
glove compartment.

There he discovered a plastic bag of

marijuana, and on this basis the defendant was convicted for
its possession.

The State Supreme Court reversed on the

ground that the inventory had been in violation of the 4th
Amendment and the United States Supreme Court disagreed.
The Chief Justice in his plurality opinion, noted that the
"diminished" expectation of privacy as to automobiles and
other reasons customarily given for police inventories of
impounded vehicles.
However, Justice Powell concurring in Opperman, did
no more than agree that "the routine inventory search was
constitutional," . . .
-16-

The opinion of the plurality takes pains to
emphasize that the owner "was not present to make other
arrangements for the safe keeping of his belongings."
In State v. Hygh, 711 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the Supreme
Court of Utah held that a so called inventory search was
invalid because among other things, the police officer did
not involve the owner of the vehicle, who was present, in
his decision to conduct the search and did not permit the
owner to make other reasonable disposition of the vehicle.
In addition and of great importance the Court said
that fundamental constitutional guarantees against
unreasonable searches cannot be evaded by labeling them
"inventory" search.
The dissentors in Opperman asserted that "if the
owner of the vehicle is in police custody or otherwise in
communication with police, is consent to the inventory is
pre-requisite to an inventory search."
As pointed out by LaFave in his work on Search and
Seizure, a Treatise on The Fourth Amendment, 2nd edition, in
speaking about Opperman said,
"but what then in the very common situation
which the cars is impounded incident to the
arrest the person occupying the vehicle? Would
that person (usually owner or someone using his
car with his permission) at hand, should he not
be asked whether he prefers the security which
might result from inventory or the privacy which
would result from no inventory? The Opperman
dissenters certainly thought so. Further they
assert that, "if the owners of the vehicles in
-17-

police custody or otherwise in communication
with the police, his consent to the inventory
is pre-requisite to an inventory search*n
It cannot be stated unequivocably that those
members of the Court subscribing to the
plurality opinion necessarily are in disagreement
on this pointf for that opinion takes pains to
emphasize the owner "was not present to make
arrangements for the safe keeping of his
belongings."
In the instant case as the facts brought out by the
suppression hearing and the trial indicate, the trunk of
the defendant's was locked and officer Mangelson used the
keys taken from the defendant to open the trunk.

Defendant

Baird's permission was neither asked for or obtained with
respect to the inventory search of his carf nor was he
ever appraised of the fact that such a inventory search
was going to take place or was taking place.
(Suppression hearing transcript, page 12, 13, 35, 36,
37.)
Thus, even if an inventory search would have been valid,
the search conducted by Officer Mangelson was not an
inventory search but rather was made as an investigatory search
conducted without a warrant.

Neither permission from the

defendant or any exigent circumstances justifies the
search.

Officer Mangelson was asked by defendant's counsel

at trial, "is it normal procedure of an officer to contact
the county attorney and the sheriff to conduct the
inventory searches of the vehicle that you are involved
in?"
-18-

A.

It is not normal, no.

Q.

Okay, is that recorded under Highway Department

policies to contact the County Attorney and the Sheriff's
Department?
A.

Is it?

Q.

Or the Highway Patrol policy?

A.

No.

(Trial transcript, page 24 and 25.)
Also, Mr. Eyre, the prosecutor asked:
Q. Was there any specific reason that you asked myself
and the sheriff to accompany you on this vehicle inventory?
A.

Yes there is.

Q.

Why was that?

A.

I suspected a quantity of contraband in the

vehicle, specifically marijuana, because of the smell at
the place of the arrest.
Other states have adopted positions similar to that
found in Hygh.

That is they held that the vehicle inventory

must be conducted in good faith and not as a pretext

and

that this means that the discovery must be totally uncontemplated. Gonzales v. State, 506 P.2d, 1277 (Okl.Crim. 1973).
This Court should hold hold that even if the search of
defendant's Baird automobile can be classified as an
inventory

type search, the fact that it was made

specifically looking for contraband makes the search invalid
-19-

and therefore, that the evidence of what was found in the
trunk should not have been allowed to have been presented at
the defendant Baird's trial*
Although authority exists permitting an inventory type
search to extends to the locked trunk of the vehicle; U.S.
v. Duncan, 763 P2d 220 (6th Cir.1985); United States v. Orozcof
715 F.2d 158 (5th Cir.1983); Colyer v. State, 9 Ark.Appl 1,
652 S.W.2d 645 (1983).
The better reasoned opinions indicate that inventory
searches encompassing a locked trunk are violations of a
defendant Baird's Fourth Amendment rights. United States
v. Wilson, 636 F.2d 1161 (8th Cir.1980) (inventory of
locked trunk improper, as "the possibility of loss and the
possibility of false claims against the police" can best be
presented by never opening the trunk at all); Mozzetti vs.
Superior Court, 4 Cal.3d 699, 94 Ca.Rptr.412, 484 P.2d 84
(1971); People v. Grana, 185 Colo. 126, 527 P.2d 543
(1974);

State v. Boster, 217 Kan. 618, 539 P.2d 294

(1975);

State vs. Hatfield, 364 So.2d 578 (La.1978)

(inventory not "reasonably restricted in scope" where
"officers persisted in opening a locked trunk although
defendant was unwilling");

State v. Williams, 654 S.W.2d

238 (Mo.App.1983) (greater expectation of privacy in trunk
and thus inventory may not be extended there where the
"nature of the charge for which appellant was arrested
-20-

would indicate that she might be in custody but a short
time");

State vs. Catlette, 88 S.D.406, 221 N.W.2d 25

(1974); State v. Houser, 95 Wash.2d 143, 622 P.2d 1218
(1980) ("property locked in the trunk of an automobile, as
here, presents no great danger of theft").
The so called inventory search was in reality an
impermissible search for contraband or evidence.
It is clear that the search of defendant Bairdfs carf
especially the locked trunk, was not a mere inventory
search, but rather was a search conducted to find evidence
of a crime.
CONCLUSION
The search and seizure of defendant Baird and his
automobile was without any facts showing a reasonable
suspicion by Officer Mangelson.

Therefore the stop and

seizure was made in violation of defendant Baird1s rights
under both the United States and Utah Constitutions.

In a

similar manner all searches, including the so called
inventory search which occurred after and as a result of
the first seizure of defendant Baird were also made in
violation of defendant Baird1s rights.
All of the evidence obtained from these above described
searches was therefore obtained in violation of defendant
Baird1s rights and therefore, should have been suppressed
at defendant Bairdfs trial.
WHEREFORE, defendant Baird prays that this honorable
Court reverse the guilty verdict of the lower Court.
-21-

DATED this 24th day of November, 1987.
JIMI MITSUNAGA
Attorney for Defendant-Appellant
731 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY
Mailed three copies of the foregoing Brief of
the Defendant/Appellant to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County
Attorney, 125 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 84648 this 24th
day of November, 1987.
Jimi Mitsunaga
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH, IN AND FOR JUAB COUNTY

STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintifff
vs.

DEFENDANTfS MEMORANDUM ]
SUPPORT OF MOTION TO SUI
Criminal No. 62-D

RICHARD C. BAIRD,

Judge Boyd L. Park

Defendant.
COMES NOW the defendant and herewith submits the
following Memorandum in Support of Defendants Motion to
Suppress.
RELIEF SOUGHT
Defendant seeks to suppress all items of physical
evidence taken from or observed in the vehicle driven by
the defendant on February 9r 1987, by the Utah Highway
Patrol or anyone acting in its behalff including marijuana.
Further, defendant moves to suppress any testimony of the
arresting officer regarding his observation of items in the
vehicle or statements of the defendant made after the
illegal stop.

FACTS
On February 9, 1987f at 3:45 p.m., Trooper Magelsonf
Sgt., Utah Highway Patrol, was parked in the center medium
facing south outside of Nephi, Juab County, Utahr when he
observed a front and rear plates, but could not make out the
validation i.e.; that it had a December validation but he
could not tell whether it was a 1986 or 1987. He had
placed a radar gun on the vehicle and it registered at 56
miles per hour.
He started pursuit of the vehicle.

At this point he

had not received any radio transmission regarding this
particular vehicle and the speed of the vehicle was not a
factor in his decision to pursue the vehicle.
The only reason he pursued the vehicle was that as
the vehicle passed his position, he could see the sticker,
but couldn't tell what it was.
As the vehicles closed, around three to four car
lengths, he could read "December11, but could not read the
year.

He stopped the vehicle for the sole reason to

determine the year of the sticker.

When he was within ten

feet of the stopped vehicle, the Trooper saw that it was a
valid Arizona 1987 validation even before he looked into
the car.
The trooper, having determined that the sticker was
valid, continued to approach the vehicle and scanned it.
There were no vehicle violations or equipment violations.
-2-

From the trooperfs experience, the defendant did not fit
the profile of a suspected drug transporter.
The trooper asked for a driver's license and vehicle
registration and a stolen vehicle check was negative and
the driver's license check showed that the defendant had a
suspended license (financial responsiblity).
The defendant was placed under arrest for driving
under suspension and he was booked into the Juab County Jail.
The vehicle was initially held for owner which would
not require any inventory search.
The vehicle was inventoried pursuant to the Utah
Highway Patrol policy as to towed vehicles.

The trooper

obtained the car keys from the defendant's personal
property at the jail without the knowledge or consent of
the defendant.
The inventory was conducted at 1715 hours in the
presence of the County Attorney and Sheriff, persons who
are not ordinarily invited to inventory searches.
AGREEMENT
That the trooperfs stop of the defendant in his
vehicle was without reasonable suspicion of criminal
activity and violated the Fourth Amendment of the U. S. Constitution, Utah Constitution and UCA 77-7-15.

By virtue of

said illegal stop, the consequent search and seizure of all
items taken from the defendant's vehicle and admission of
the defendant should be suppressed.

-31*

Brown vs. Texas, 443, U.S. 47f 99 S. Ct., 2632, 66L Ed
2d 357 (1979) sets forth the principle that the Fourth
Amendment applies to all seizures of the person, including
detention short of traditional arrest.

Whenever a police

officer accosts an individual and restrains his freedom to
walk away, he has "seized" that person and the Fourth Amendment requires that the seizure be reasonable.
The Supreme Court goes on to state that the
reasonableness of seizures that are less intrusive than a
traditional arrest depends upon the "balance between the
public interest and the individual's right to personal
security free from arbitrary interference by law officers.
"To this end, the Fourth Amendment requires that a
seizure of a particular individual must be based upon
specific, objective facts indicating that society1s
legitimate interests require the seizure of the particular
individual or that the seizure must be carried out pursuant
to a plan embodying explicit, neutral limitation on the
conduct of the individual officer."
Brown vs. Texas, Supra, p363, L Ed.
"In the absence of any basis for suspecting the
appellant of misconduct, the balance between the public
interest and the appellantfs rights to personal security
and privacy tilts in favor of freedom from police interference."
Brown vs. Texas, p 363, L Ed.
The mandate found in Brown vs. Texas is embodied in UCA
77-7-15 which reads:
-4-

"A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is attempting
to commit a public offense and may demand his name,
address and an explanation of his actions".
This statute has been interpreted at least twice by the
Utah Supreme Court.
State vs. Swanigony 699 P2d 718 (1985) per curiam
decision.

The defendant was convicted of burglary.

Mr. Baumgartner had been burglarized.
discovered at 10:30 p.m..
case.

It was

Officer Young was assigned the

A block from the victim1s homer Young noticed two.

young individuals.

Young called the dispatcher and

requested broadacast of an "attempt to locate" the two
individuals he had seen.
Two hours later, another officer spotted the two
individuals fitting the general description given by
Officer Young.

The second officer ordered the two

individuals to stop and asked for identification.

A

warrant check was made and it was discovered that there was
an outstanding traffic warrant and the two were arrested.
In a subsequent pat down search, the officer recovered some
of the property taken from the victim1s home.
On appeal, the defendant sought a reversal based upon
the erroneous admission of incriminating evidence.

The

state confessed the error, admitting that the evidence as
seized as a result of an unlawful detention.
-5-

The Utah Supreme Court reverses the conviction based upon
Brown vs. Texas,
Again in State vs. Carpena, per curiam, 27 Utah
Advance Reports 29 (Feb. 1986), the Utah Supreme Court
affirmed the Second District trial decision in suppressing
evidence of marijuana taken from the defendant's vehicle,
citing UCA 77-7-15 and Brown vs. Texas.
In the Carpena case, two officers were patroling a
neighborhood in which a rash of burglaries had recently
occurred.

At 3 a.m., they observed a moving vehicle with

Arizona plates.

Officers did not observe any criminal

activity or traffic offense and no report of burglaries had
been reported.
Officers followed the car for three blocks and turned
on the red lights. The car turned into a driveway of a
residence belonging to one of the occupants and the
occupants got out of the car. After finding one unloaded
pistol under the driver's seat, the officer removed the
keys and opened the trunk without the consent of any of the
occupants.

Thirty pounds of marijuana was found in the trunk.

The Utah Supreme Court held that the District Court
did not err in determining that the officer had no reasonable
suspicion to make an investigating stop.

The officer had

no objective facts upon which to base a reasonable
suspicion that the men was involved in criminal activity.
In the instant case, there was no traffic violation, no
equipment violation and no reports of any illegal activity
-6/J J.

involving this defendant or the vehicle.

The trooper

followed this vehicle because he couldn't read whether the
sticker on the license plate was 1986 or 1987. As he
approached the vehicle from the rear, he was able to
discover that there was a current validation, i.e.: 1987
sticker.
The trooper's conduct thereafter, i.e.; his
observation of the contents of the vehicle, identity of the
driver, check on the vehicle and driver"s license and
conversation with the defendant was a result of the illegal
stop.
CONCLUSIONS
Based upon the facts and the law, the defendant's Motion
to Suppress all items of evidence and the conversation of the
defendant must be suppressed.
DATED this 8th day of May, 1987.

Attorney for the DefendantAppellant

DELIVERED a copy of the foregoing Memorandum in Support
of Motion to Suppress to Donald J. Eyre, Jr., Juab County
Attorney, at 146 North Main Street, Nephi, Utah 8i4648 this
f

8th day of May, 1987.

J

c^^j-rlni Mitsunaga//
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Donald J, Eyre Jr•
Juab County Attorney
125 North Main Street
Nephi, Utah 84648
Te 1ephone: 623-1141

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
JUAB COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

STATE OF UTAH,

:
Plaintiff,

vs.
RICHARD C. BAIRD,
Defendant.

:

MEMORANDUM IN OPPOSITION
TO MOTION TO SUPPRESS

:

Criminal No. 62-D

:

Comes now the State of Utah by and through the Juab
County Attorney and submits the following Memorandum in
opposition to the defendants Motion to Suppress.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
A full hearing was held on defendants Motion to
Suppress on May 8, 1987, at which time the Court became
fully aware of the facts in this case.

A brief summary is

that on February 9, 1987 Paul Mangelson, a twenty year
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veteran of the Highway Patrol was located in the median of
1-15 in the Mona, Juab County area.

He observed the 1979

Cadi lac driven by the defendant, Richard C. Baird, which had
Arizona license plates*

Sergeant Mangelson could not

initially determine whether the defendant's license plates
were valid or whether they had expired*

He then followed

the vehicle for a period of time, but he still could not
determine whether the plates had a 1986 or a 1987
validation, so he pulled the vehicle over with the aid of
his red light to make closer examination of the plate*

It

wasn't until he had exited his vehicle and he was within ten
to twelve feet of the rear of defendant's vehicle that he
determine the plates were valid*
After determining the plates were valid, he
simultaneously made other observations of the vehicle as he
approached the driver's side window.

He observed al1 new

tires, new air shocks, the twisted off top to locking gas
cap on the back seat, the bumper jack and big wrench in the
back seat area.

When the defendant rolled down his window

he detected the smell of marijuana.
After reviewing the defendant's driver's license and
car registration information and requesting information from
Page 2

his radio dispatcher. Sergeant Mangelson determined that the
defendant's Utah driver's license was suspended and the
subject motor vehicle was not registered to him.
Sergeant Mangelson then made a custodial arrest of the
defendant and the vehicle was towed to Nephi.

An inventory

search of the vehicle was subsequently made pursuant to Utah
Highway Patrol policy and 165 lbs. of marijuana was found in
the trunk which resulted in the present felony charge
against the defendant.
ARGUMENT
The actions of Sergeant Mangelson as set forth in his
testimony at the suppression hearing were neither unlawful
or unconstitutional under the 4th amendement or under
Article 1 Section 14 of the Utah Constitution.

Counsel for

the defendant in his argument at the hearing seemed to
acknowledge that the actions of the officer in stopping the
defendant's vehicle to determine whether the license plates
had valid stickers was lawful, but he merely argued that
once the officer determined the plates were valid, he was
obligated to stop and not have any further contact with the
defendant.

To require such conduct by a police officer is
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clearly not the standard required by the Utah or U. S.
Supreme Court.
There are three separate levels of police encounters
with the public*

They are:

<1)

An officer may approach a citizen at anytime
and pose questions so long as the citizen is
not detained against his will.

<2)

An officer may seize a person if the officer
has an "articulable suspicion" that the
person has committed or is about to commit
a crime; however the detention must be
temporary and last no longer than is
necessary to effectuate the purpose of the
stop j

(3)

An officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an
offense has been committed or is being
committed. See Florida v. Rover. 460
U.S. 491, 498-499 (1983)

Sergeant Mangelson's actions in initially stopping the
vehicle comes within criteria No. 2 in that he had an
articulable reason for stopping the vehicle.
discovered

Once he

the vehicle had valid plates his approach of the

driver came within criteria No. 1, moreover, even before the
officer had direct contact with the defendant he made
observations in or about the vehicle which again gave him an
articulable reasonable suspicion to temporarily detain the
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defendant, which subsequently resulted in the lawful seizure
of the 165 lbs, of marijuana.
The appropriate standard for investigative detentions
was articulated by the United States Supreme Court in Terrv
v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1 (1968); and Brown v. Texas. 443 U. S. 47
(1979) and is codified in section 77-7-15 U.C.A. as follows:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public
place when he has reasonable suspicion to believe
he has committed or is in the act of committing or
is attempting to commit a public offense and may
demand his name, address and an explanation of his
actions.
Clearly Officer Mangelson had an articulable reasonable
suspicion to make the initial stop of the defendant and
would be an absurd interpretation of the above principal of
law, to require the officer to walk away from the vehicle
once he had determined the plates were valid.

Mere common

courtesy would permit the officer to approach the driver to
explain the stop.
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State v. Torres.
29 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973) considered the stop and
detention situation.

In that case the Court said, "that the

test to be applied on the question as to whether"
appellants constitutional rights have been abridged:
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. . .is one of reasonableness: that is whether
fair-minded persons, knowing the facts, and taking
into consideration not only the rights of the
individuals involved in the inquiry or search, but
also the broader interests of the public to be
protected from crime and criminals, would regard
the conduct of the officers as being unreasonable.
Under the present fact situation the approach by Officer
Mangelson of the defendant after he had determined that the
license plates were valid was not an unreasonable act and
therefore the evidence should not be suppressed.
Even if the Court finds that the acts of Officer
Mangelson violated the defendant's constitutional rights in
some manner, before the Court can suppress the subject
evidence the Court must find pursuant to section 77-35-12
<g) that the violation must be substantial and that the
offficer did not act in good faith.

In the present case the

defendant's expectation of privacy could not have been very
great, he was not lawfully on the highway (his driving
privilege in Utah was suspended), the vehicle in which he
was traveling did not belong to him, and the unlawful
detention by the officer, if any, was minimally intrusive
and lasted no longer than reasonably necessary to effect its
purpose.

Further there was no evidence that Officer

Mangelson acted in bad faith.

Absent a showing of a

Page 6

substantial violation or evidence of bad faith, there should
not be an exclusion of the subject evidence.

See United

S U t g g V, LgQn, 468 U. S. 897 (1984).
For all the foregoing reasons the defendants Motion to
Suppress should be denied.
Dated this

W

day bf May, 1987.

Donald J. Eyre J
Juab County Attorney
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing
Memorandum In Opposition To Motion To Suppress to Jimi
Mitsunaga, Attorney for Defendant, 731 East South^Temple
Street, Salt Lake City, Utah 84102v>n this
/^f
da
day of
May, 1987.
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IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
JUAB COUNTY,

STATE OF UTAH

Pat P. 6reenwood,C!wk—Deputy

*******

Case Number

STATE OF UTAH,

62-D

Plaintiff,
vs.

RULING

RICHARD C. BAIRD,
Defendant.
********

This matter is before the court on defendant Richard C.
Baird's Motion to Suppress and pursuant to Rule 3.5, Rules of
Practice of the District Courts, an evidentiary hearing was heard
on May 8, 1987.
FACTS
On February 9, 1987, Officer Paul Officer Mangelson,
Utah Highway Patrol, was parked on the median of 1-15 in the
Mona, Juab County - area.

At about 3:45 p.m. Officer Mangelson

observed the defendant driving a vehicle with Arizona license
plates.

He could not make out whether the December validation

sticker was for the year 1986 or 1987. Officer Mangelson pursued
the

vehicle

but still

validation sticker.
at 56 M.P.H.

could

not determine

the

vehicle,

on the

The defendant was registered on a radar gun

Finally, Officer Mangelson pulled the vehicle over

to make a closer examination of the license plate.
his

year

Officer

Mangelson

1

approached

the

After exiting
vehicle

the

defendant was driving.
Officer
current.

Mangelson

About ten to twelve feet from the vehicle

determined

the

validation

sticker

to

be

As he continued to approach the defendant he made

several observations which concerned him such as new tires, new
air shocks, a twisted off locking gas cap on the back seat, and a
bumper

jack

and

a

lug

wrench

in

the

back

seat

area.

Additionally, Officer Mangelson detected the smell of marijuana
when the defendant rolled down his window.

Officer Mangelson

inspected the defendant's driver license and car registration and
subsequently

determined

that

the

defendant's

license

was

suspended and that the vehicle was not registered to him.

The

defendant was arrested for driving on a suspended license and
booked into the Juab County jail.

The defendant's vehicle was

towed to Nephi and an inventory search of the vehicle conducted.
The search yielded 165 lbs. of marijuana.
DISCUSSION
The defendant argues that Officer Mangelson's stop was
without reasonable suspicion of criminal activity and therefore
violated the Fourth Amendment of the U.S. Constitution, the Utah
Constitution and Section 77-7-15 U.C.A..

The text of Section 77-

7-15 U.C.A. is recited for the court:
A peace officer may stop any person in a public place
when he has a reasonable suspicion to believe he has
committed or is in the act of committing or is
attempting to commit a public offense and may demand
his name, address and an explanation of his actions.
The court is also referred to three cases in connection with this
argument. Brown

v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47

(1979) and

State v.

Swanigan, 699 P.2d 718 (Utah 1985); and State v. Carpena, 714

2
•sy

P.2d

675 (Utah 1986).

quotes

Brown

for

the

LLC.A. —• that "[a]
police

officers

reasonable

Carpena refers to Swanigan which in turn
principle

stated

in

Section

77-7-15

brief investigatory stop of an individual by
is

permissible

suspicion,

based

on

when

the

officers

objective

facts,

individual is involved in criminal activity.' "

'have
that

a
the

Swanigan, at 719,

quoting Brown v. Texas, 443 U.S. 47, 51 (1979).
The state's response is that defendant apparently does
not challenge the stopping of the vehicle, but argues that upon
determining

that

the

validation

sticker

was

current,

Officer

Mangelson was obligated to stop and not have any further contact
with the defendant.

The state claims that such conduct is not

the standard required by the U.S. or Utah Supreme Courts.

The

court is referred, first of all, to Florida v. Royer, 460 U.S.
491 (1983) for an explanation of three levels of police contact
with the public.
(1) An officer may approach a citizen at any time
and question
him so long as he
is not, even
momentarily, detained without objective grounds to do
so;
(2) An officer may seize a person if there is
articulable suspicion that the person has committed
is about to commit a crime so long as the detention
temporary and lasts no longer than is necessary
effectuate the purpose of the stop; and

an
or
is
to

(3)
An officer may arrest a suspect if the
officer has probable cause to believe an offense has
been or is being committed
The

state

cites

Brown

and

Terry

v.

Ohio,

392 U.S.

(1968) for the appropriate standards of investigative detentions,
as

articulated

by

the U.S. Supreme Court

Section 77-7-15 U.C.A..

and

as codified

in

Finally, the court is referred to State
3

v. Torres, 129 Utah 2d 269, 508 P.2d 534 (1973).

In that case

the Utah Supreme Court stated:
It should be kept in mind that the test to be applied
on the question as to whether there has been a
violation of . . . constitutional rights . . . is one
of reasonableness:
that is, whether fair-minded
persons,
knowing
the
facts,
and
taking
into
consideration not only the rights of the individuals
involved in the inquiry or search, but also the broader
interests of the public to be protected from crime and
criminals, would regard the conduct of the officers as
being unreasonable.
Referring

to the levels of police-public encounters

listed above, Officer Mangelson1s actions in initially stopping
the defendant fall within the parameters of level two.

Officer

Mangelson suspected the defendant of driving a vehicle with an
expired validation sticker.

As Officer Mangelson approached the

vehicle his suspicions were allayed and the defendant fell within
the constraints of a level one type of encounter.

At this point

Officer Mangelson could have approached the defendant and posed
questions so long as the defendant was not detained against his
will.

It is not reasonable that Officer Mangelson would have

turned around and simply walked away from the defendant without
explanation after having made the stop.

Instead, as Officer

Mangelson approached the defendant his suspicions were once again
aroused

as

to

the

possibility

of

illegal

activity

by

his

cumulative observations of new tires, new air shocks, a twisted
off locking gas cap on the back seat, a bumper jack and a lug
wrench

in

marijuana

the

back

emanating

seat
from

area, together
the

defendant's

with

the

smell of

vehicle.

Officer

Mangelson1s encounter with the defendant had once again risen to
the second level.

Officer Mangelson further determined that the
4
/'//

defendant was driving a vehicle registered to another person, and
defendant could not give Officer Mangelson the address of the
registered

owner.

It was also determined

the defendant was

driving on a suspended driver license, thus Officer Mangelsonfs
actions in arresting the defendant were elevated to the third
level

of

police-public

encounters.

Officer

Mangelson

had

probable cause to believe that an offense had been or was being
committed.

Therefore, defendant's claim that Officer Mangelson1s

conduct, i.e., his observation of the contents of the vehicle,
identity of the driver, check on the vehicle and driver's license
and conversation with the defendant was a result of the illegal
stop is without merit.
RULING
Defendant

Richard C. Bairdfs Motion

to Suppress is

denied.
DATED at Provo, Utah, this^/9 day of May, 1987.
BY THE COURT:

cc: Jimi Mitsunaga
Juab County Attorney

c

